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ISSUE PRECLUSION: UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION DETERMINATIONS AND
SECTION 301 SUITS
In this Note, the author examines whether a state unemployment compensation
agency's determination that the discharge ofan employee was based on 7ust cause"
should be given preclusive eject in a subsequent federal action by the employee
brought under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. Giving the
prior state determination preclusive efect would have a substantial impact on either
the ability of the employee to sue the employer under section 301for breach of the
collective bargaining agreement or the employer's ability to de/end in such a suit.
After examining the appicability of issue preclusion within the framework of the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments, the author concludes that preclusive effect
should not be given to state determinations in subsequentfederalsection 301 actions.
Thepolcies underlying the national labor law and the desire to promote the contin-
ued development of a uniform body of labor law support this conclusion.
INTRODUCTION
RES JUDICATA' prevents relitigation of claims' and issues3
previously determined by a competent tribunal. This doctrine
is based on the "recognition that endless litigation leads to chaos;
that certainty in legal relations must be maintained; [and] that af-
1. The general rule of res judicata is stated in RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 1
(1942):
Where a reasonable opportunity has been afforded to the parties to litigate a
claim before a court which has jurisdiction over the parties and the cause of ac-
tion, and the court has finally decided the controversy, the interests of the State
and of the parties require that the validity of the claim and any issue actually
litigated in the action shall not be litigated again by them.
2. The branch of res judicata called merger and bar or claim preclusion covers the
res judicata effect as applied to claims. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 47
(Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973) states:
When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff-
(a) The plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original claim or any
part thereof, but he can maintain an action upon the judgment; and (b) In an
action upon the judgment, the defendant cannot avail himself of defenses he
might have interposed, or did interpose, in the first action.
Bar is treated in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 48 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973)
which states that "[a valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of the defendant
bars another action by the plaintiff on the same claim." The first Restatement distin-
guished between monetary and nonmonetary judgments, with the rule that merger did not
apply to nonmonetary judgments. The second Restatement does not distinguish between
the two types of judgments.
3. Relitigation of previously determined issues is governed by the doctrine of issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel. The term "collateral estoppel" was first used in the RE-
STATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (1942), Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata,
62 Micif. L. REV. 33, 33 n.5 (1963), where collateral estoppel was separately defined for
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ter a party has had his day in court, justice, expediency, and the
preservation of the public. tranquility requires that the matter be at
an end."4
In a shift from earlier court decisions,5 modem courts have
deemed res judicata applicable to administrative tribunal determi-
nations.6 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Utah Construc-
tion & Mining Co. 7 stated "[w~hen an administrative agency is
acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate oppor-
tunity to litigate, the courts have not hesitated to apply resjudicata
to enforce repose."8 This statement, while dicta,9 has supported
numerous decisions applying res judicata to administrative law. 10
The second Restatement of Judgments incorporates the Utah
questions of fact and questions of law. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (questions
of fact), § 70 (questions of law) (1942).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977), however, uses
the term "issue preclusion" rather than "collateral estoppel" and collapses the separate
definitions into one which states: "When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judg-
ment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether
on the same or a different claim." Issue preclusion does not require identical claims, only
identical issues. For the classic statement of the distinction between merger and bar and
collateral estoppel, see Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
4. Schroeder v. 171.74 Acres of Land, 318 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1963).
5. See, e.g., Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209 (1953); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB,
323 U.S. 248 (1944); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S. 281 (1906); Churchill Tabernacle v.
FCC, 160 F.2d 244 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
6. Professor Davis, in his administrative law treatise, states that res judicata should
be applied to prior administrative determinations when the reasons for applying res judi-
cata are present in full force, modified where modification is needed, and rejected when the
reasons against its use outweigh those in its favor. 2 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 18.02 (1958). See generally Groner & Sternstein, Res Judicata in FederalAd-
ministrative Law, 39 IowA L. RFv. 300 (1954); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables:
Adjudicating Bodies, 54 GEO. L.J. 857, 874-76 (1966); Developments in the Law-Res Judi-
cata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 865-74 (1952); Note, The CollateralEstoppel Effect ofAdminir-
trative AgencyActions in Federal Ci vi Litigation, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 65 (1977).
7. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
8. Id at 422. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980)
§ 131(2), discussed in the text accompanying notes 152-70 infra, enumerates factors that
courts should consider in determining whether an agency is acting in a judicial capacity.
9. The Court, relying on statutory interpretation, held that a Board of Contract Ap-
peals decision was binding in a subsequent federal court suit. 384 U.S. at 418-20.
10. E.g., Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting Co., 416 F.2d 1081,
1083 (5th Cir. 1969) (NLRB determination binding in subsequent federal court suit);
Umberfield v. School Dist. 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974) (teacher tenure panel determina-
tion preclusive in action before Colorado Civil Rights Commission) (decision criticized in
Comment, Administrative Lan-Res Judicata-Application of Res Judicata to Agencies with
parallel Jurisdiction, 52 DEN. L.J. 595 (1975)).
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Construction position in section 131.11 This section provides that
"a valid and final adjudication by an administrative tribunal has
the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same
exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court."' 12 The
first stated exception to this section suspends the application of
that doctrine unless the administrative proceedings were "adjudi-
cative." The second Restatement, in an attempt to define an adju-
dicative proceeding, lists several requirements of such a
proceeding, including notice, finality of decision, and the right to
present evidence and arguments both in support of one's conten-
tions and in rebuttal of opposing contentions. Furthermore, issues
must be formulated by "the application of rules with respect to
specified parties concerning a specific transaction, situation, or sta-
tus. . . ." " Finally, the Restatement notes that other procedural
elements may be required for a proceeding to be adjudicative, de-
pending on "the magnitude and complexity of the matter in
question."14
The second exception to section 131 suspends claim preclusion
if the scheme of remedies permits relitigation of an already deter-
mined claim. 5 The third exception suspends issue preclusion if
that preclusion would contravene a legislative policy that the ini-
tial determination be made in an especially expeditious proceed-
ing, or that the second tribunal "be free to make an independent
determination of the issue in question." 6 Because the second Re-
statement considers both the nature of the initial proceeding as it
relates to the requirement of a judicial determination and the
competing policies against the application of res judicata, it pro-
vides a useful framework for determining which administrative
determinations should be given subsequent preclusive effect. This
Note, therefore, will use the Restatement as a reference.
This Note also will examine whether a state unemployment
compensation agency's prior determination that an employee's
11. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131 (rent. Draft No. 7, 1980). The
original Restatement explicitly excluded administrative determinations from the scope of
its coverage. RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS, Introduction at 2 (1942).
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(1) (rent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
13. Id § 131(2)(c).
14. Id § 131(2). The right to subpoena witnesses and to judicial review are two pro-
cedural requirements listed as examples. Id at Comment c.
15. Id § 131(3). The Reporter's Note cites Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
v. United States Dept. of Labor, 583 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1978), as an example of a case in
which a claim adjudicated in a state administrative proceeding was not a bar to bringing a
similar claim under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(4) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
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discharge was based on just cause should have preclusive effect in
a subsequent federal action brought by the employee under Sec-
tion 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). 17
Specifically, if a state unemployment compensation agency were
to determine that no just cause existed for an employee's dis-
charge18 and that determination were given preclusive effect, then,
in a subsequent suit for the employer's breach of the just cause for
discharge clause in the collective bargaining agreement,' 9 the dis-
charged employee could obtain summary judgment on the issue of
liability. The court then would have only to determine the em-
ployee's damages. If, conversely, the state agency were to deter-
mine that just cause did exist, then the employer, in a subsequent
action brought by the employee, could obtain summary judgment
against the employee. Thus, allowing preclusive effect to be given
to this determination greatly would aid one of the parties to the
later suit, depending on the outcome in the first action, and would
expedite the proceedings.
Since this potential use of res judicata involves an administra-
tive determination, Restatement (Second) section 131 is applica-
ble. Because this use of res judicata also would give preclusive
17. LMRA § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization
representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chap-
ter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
See notes 66-92 infra and accompanying text.
18. All state unemployment compensation statutes disqualify a claimant from receiv-
ing benefits if his or her unemployment is due to his or her own fault. Accordingly, if there
is just cause for the discharge by reason of the employee's misconduct, the claimant is
denied benefits. See, eg., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 48, § 432 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593(3) (McKinney
1977).
Throughout this Note, examples of unemployment compensation statutory provisions
are drawn from three states representing the east, midwest, and west. These statutes are
representative of those throughout the country. In this Note, it is assumed that the unem-
ployment compensation determination is not the initial determination of benefits, but
rather is one made on review, either by a single referee or a board of review. See notes
55-60 infra and accompanying text for the review procedures. This assumption is made
because an initial determination is made without a hearing and therefore probably would
not meet the requirements of an adjudicatory proceeding, as required by the RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(2) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
19. A recent study of collective bargaining agreements reported that 96% of the agree-
ments analyzed contained discharge and discipline provisions. These provisions were of
two types: discharge for cause or just cause and discharge for specific offenses. A general
statement that discharge may be for cause or just cause was found in 80% of the agree-
ments, whereas 65% of the agreements mentioned specific grounds. [1978] 2 COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1.
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effect to a state determination in a subsequent action in federal
court, Restatement (Second) section 13420 is applicable. That sec-
tion provides that a valid, final judgment of a state court has the
same res judicata effect in federal court as it would have in the
state court in which the judgment was rendered. This general pro-
vision, however, is subject to both a claim preclusion and an issue
preclusion exception. Both exceptions allow relitigation if accord-
ing preclusive effect to the determination would be inconsistent
with a statutory scheme or policy which would allow the second
tribunal to make an independent determination of the claim or
issue in question. Thus, the exceptions under section 134 which
allow for relitigation are analogous to the part of section 131
which advances a similar policy."1
This Note, in determining whether a state administrative de-
termination should preclude further litigation in federal court,
will examine whether the federal court action has special attrib-
utes which warrant relitigation of the issues. This Note also will
explore the policies underlying res judicata to determine whether,
in a suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement, policies
for allowing an independent determination outweigh policies for
applying res judicata.
The first section of this Note will examine state unemployment
compensation schemes, with particular emphasis on state interpre-
tation of just cause for discharge and eligibility procedures.22 This
inquiry is necessary to determine whether the state interpretation
of just cause is analogous to the interpretation of just cause in
collective bargaining agreements. Furthermore, it is also neces-
sary to determine whether the state unemployment compensation
proceedings are adjudicative, as required by section 131 of the sec-
ond Restatement. Section 301 suits then will be examined to as-
certain whether a 301 claim has specific attributes warranting an
independent determination by a federal court.2 3 Thirdly, this
Note will explore the interrelationship of these claims with the
doctrine of res judicata.24 This exploration first will outline the
elements and competing policies of issue preclusion 5 to determine
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 134 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
21. Id § 131(4)(b).
22. See notes 29-65 infra and accompanying text.
23. See notes 66-92 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 93-188 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 100-51 infra and accompanying text. Merger and bar is not treated in
this Note because it involves identical claims in two actions. The situation which this Note
considers involves two separate claims sharing a common issue.
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whether an unemployment compensation determination and a
section 301 suit meet the prerequisites of issue preclusion neces-
sary to determine the effects of the second Restatement sections
131 and 134.26 The Restatement provisions then will be applied to
unemployment compensation proceedings and section 301 suits.27
In this application, an evaluation will be made of the adjudicative
nature of unemployment compensation proceedings, the need for
expeditious proceedings in the determination of unemployment
compensation benefits, and the requirement of section 301 suits
for independent determinations by a federal court. Finally, this
Note will conclude that unemployment compensation determina-
tions, though adjudicative in nature, should not be given preclu-
sive effect in a subsequent section 301 suit. 8 The nature of both
unemployment compensation proceedings and section 301 suits
supports this conclusion.
I. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION
To determine whether an unemployment compensation board
finding should be given preclusive effect, it is necessary to consider
state unemployment compensation schemes.29 First, the policies
underlying state unemployment compensation statutes wil be ex-
amined" to determine whether state unemployment compensa-
tion decisions reflect these policies. If these policies conflict with
those allowing suits for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment, then preclusive effect should not be accorded the agency
determination. The interpretations of just cause for discharge for
state and collective bargaining agreement purposes then will be
examined 3 for consistency. Finally, the procedures for the receipt
of benefits will be examined 32 to determine whether a decision by
a state unemployment compensation board was made by a quasi-
judicial body as required by Utah Construction.33
26. Each section notes that the specific rule of that section is subject to the general
requirements of res judicata. It is first necessary, therefore, to determine if the general
requirements of res judicata are satisfied.
27. See notes 152-88 infra and accompanying text.
28. See notes 188-92 infra and accompanying text.
29. A complete analysis of unemployment compensation is beyond the scope of this
Note. For a general overview of state unemployment compensation laws, see [1967] 1B
UNEMPL. INs. REP. (CCH) 9 1001-2300.
30. See notes 34-45 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 46-50 infra and accompanying text.
32. See notes 51-65 infra and accompanying text.
33. 384 U.S. at 422. The factors listed in § 131(2) of the second Restatement (Tent.
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State unemployment compensation laws are part of a national
scheme created by Titles II13 and 1X 35 of the Social Security Act
of 193536 to mitigate the economic effects of widespread unem-
ployment. The Social Security Act did not establish a national
system for unemployment compensation benefits; rather, it was
meant to prod the states into enacting their own unemployment
compensation system.37 As an incentive for such enactment, the
Social Security Act provided that the federal government would
pay the cost of state administration 38 and that tax credits would be
given to participating employers39 as compensation for contribu-
tions to state unemployment funds. Within two years of the en-
actment of the Social Security Act, every state had enacted an
unemployment compensation law.40
The policy behind these state unemployment compensation
laws is illustrated by the stated purpose of California's law:
Experience has shown that large numbers of the population
of California do not enjoy permanent employment by reason of
which their purchasing power is unstable. This is detrimental
to the interests of the people of California as a whole ....
Experience has shown that private charity and local relief
cannot alone prevent the effects of unemployment....
The Legislature therefore declares that in its considered
judgment the public good and the general welfare of its citizens
of the State require the enactment of this measure under the
police power of the State, for the compulsory setting aside of
funds to be used for a system of unemployment insurance pro-
viding benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their
own, and to reduce involuntar unemployment and suffering
caused thereby to a minimum.4'
This policy suggests that unemployment compensation laws were
enacted not only to benefit the unemployed, but also to strengthen
the state's economy in periods of unemployment. Thus, as reme-
dial statutes enacted under the state's police power,42 unemploy-
ment compensation laws should be interpreted broadly to benefit
Draft No. 7, 1980) as elements of adjudication are also factors which a court would con-
sider in determining whether the tribunal was quasi-judicial.
34. Social Security Act §§ 301-303, 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1976).
35. Id §§ 901-908, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1108 (1976).
36. Id §§ 1-2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397f (1976).
37. Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L.J. 21, 32 (1945).
38. Social Security Act § 302, 42 U.S.C. § 502 (1976).
39. I.R.C. §§ 3301-3311.
40. Witte, supra note 37, at 34.
41. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 100 (West 1972) (emphasis added).
42. See, e.g., Zelney v. Murphy, 387 II1. 492, 499, 56 N.E.2d 754, 758 (1944).
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the greatest number of persons.4 3 By conferring benefits in bor-
derline cases, the purchasing power of individuals can be in-
creased and the economy strengthened.
The stated purpose of California's unemployment compensa-
tion statute indicates that benefits are conferred only on individu-
als who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Thus,
California and many other states withhold unemployment benefits
for a specified time where that unemployment is attributable to
personal misconduct-just cause for discharge.' Although other
major disqualifications exist,45 this Note will focus on discharge
for work-related misconduct.
Misconduct for which the employee is discharged is the stan-
dard by which state unemployment boards determine whether an
employer had just cause for discharging an employee. Thus, if the
employee had been discharged for work-related misconduct, then
the employer would have just cause, under state law, for discharg-
ing the employee. If, conversely, the employee's conduct did not
constitute work-related misconduct, then no just cause for the dis-
charge could exist. To determine eligibility for benefits, therefore,
the state unemployment board must determine the existence of
just cause for discharge. Furthermore, the state's interpretation of
just cause may be determinative in concluding whether to give
preclusive effect to a state finding on the issue. Thus, if the state's
interpretation of just cause is similar to that which would be given
under a collective bargaining agreement, then there may be
grounds to accept the state interpretation as binding in a breach of
contract suit.
Courts have interpreted just cause for discharge as:
'conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an em-
ployer's interests as is found in deliberate violations or disre-
gard of standards of behavior which the employer has the right
to expect of his employee, or in carelessness or negligence of
such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, . . .
[but not] mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct ... inad-
43. See, ag., Machcinski v. Ford Motor Co., 277 App. Div. 634, 639-40, 102 N.Y.S.2d
208, 213 (1951) ("This is a remedial statute, a humanitarian statute, and should be con-
strued accordingly. It is the general rule that a liberal construction is accorded statutes
which are regarded by courts as humanitarian or which are grounded on a humane public
policy.").
44. E.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1256 (West Supp. 1980); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48,
§ 432 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 593 (McKinney 1977).
45. E.g., failure to seek suitable employment, voluntary separation from employment,
or unemployment due to a labor dispute. [1967] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1963.
19811
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vertencies or ordinary negligence. ... 46
As this interpretation suggests, an employee's conduct that war-
rants termination may not constitute sufficient misconduct to
disqualify the employee from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion benefits.47
In determining whether the employee's conduct should dis-
qualify him or her from receiving benefits, an unemployment
compensation board may examine the employer's work rules, in-
cluding those rules established by the collective bargaining agree-
ment. In Delgado v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board,48
for example, the court reviewed an unemployment compensation
appeals board determination and noted that the employee had vi-
olated the employer's rule requiring cashiers to ring up each sale
as the money was received. The court, however, concluded that
the employee was entitled to benefits because she had not acted in
malice toward the employer by attempting to please the customers
and increase her employer's profits. This result illustrates that not
all violations of work rules will constitute misconduct under the
statute.
When the employer's work rules are incorporated into the col-
lective bargaining agreement, the appeals board may refer to an
arbitrator's finding to determine whether there was conduct which
merits disqualification from benefits. This finding, however, may
not always be binding on the appeals board. The court in Morgen
v. CBS, Inc. ," in reviewing an appeals board determination, held
46. Jacobs v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 25 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1037,
102 Cal. Rptr. 364, 366 (1972) (quoting Lacy v. California Unemployment Ins. Appeals
Bd., 17 Cal. App. 3d 1128, 1132, 95 Cal. Rptr. 566, 568 (1971)). The court remanded the
case to determine whether alcoholism, which was the cause of excessive absenteeism, was
volitional, because the court interpreted misconduct to require voluntary conduct.
For other determinations ofjust cause for discharge, see Roundtree v. Board of Review,
4 Ill. App. 3d 695, 281 N.W.2d 360 (1972) (falsification of material statement on employ-
ment application is misconduct connected with employment); Fiscarelli v. Ross, 65 App.
Div. 2d 855, 410 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1978) (writing letter to probate court not misconduct even
though letter not in the best interest of the employer); Morgen v. CBS, Inc., 54 App. Div.
2d 523, 386 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1976) (tardiness and excessive absences without excuse consti-
tuted misconduct). See also the cases listed at [1967] 1B UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) t 1970.
47. See, eg., Fiscarelli v. Ross, 65 App. Div. 2d 855, 856, 410 N.Y.S.2d 170, 172 (1978)
("Inefficiency, negligence and bad judgment are valid causes for discharge but do not
render a claimant ineligible for benefits.").
48. 41 Cal. App. 3d 788, 116 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974).
49. 54 App. Div. 2d 523, 524, 386 N.Y.S.2d 239, 240 (1976). Compare Maye v. Alle-
gheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 48 App. Div. 2d 754, 368 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1975) (arbitrator's
award not binding) with Slade v. Levine, 41 App. Div. 2d 800, 341 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1973),
aft'd, 34 N.Y.2d 919, 316 N.E.2d 868, 359 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1974) (mem.) (arbitrator's award
binding on both employer and employee). The court in Maye distinguished Slade on the
[Vol. 31:862
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that an arbitrator's award which justified the discharge under the
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude an unemploy-
ment compensation hearing on the issue. The basis of the court's
holding was that the issues before the arbitrator and the unem-
ployment compensation referee were dissimilar and that justifica-
tion for discharge does not always constitute misconduct under
the statute.5 0 The court's reasoning demonstrated a reluctance to
examine only the collective bargaining agreement to determine
whether an employee's conduct was just cause for dismissal under
the unemployment compensation statute. Rather, the court ex-
amined the employee's conduct to determine whether it mani-
fested a gross disregard for the employer's interest.
For any unemployment compensation determination to have
preclusive effect, the determination must have been made by a tri-
bunal affording certain procedural safeguards." Although the
procedures for determining benefits under state unemployment
compensation schemes differ,52 the procedural safeguards afforded
by these schemes are similar.
All states require that an unemployed worker file a claim for
benefits to meet the requirements of eligibility.53 The employee's
last employer is notified of the claim submitted and given the op-
portunity to furnish information about the employee. 4 The
unemployment compensation commissioner then uses the infor-
mation submitted by the employee and the employer to determine
whether benefits should be paid and if so, in what amount. The
claimant or the employer can appeal an adverse determination to
a referee who sits on the first level of review." Notice must be
basis that the employee in Maye had been reinstated and was awarded some back pay. 48
App. Div. 2d at 754, 368 N.Y.S.2d at 87. In Slade, the court noted that the arbitrator's
reinstatement order abrogated the employee's discharge so that, as a matter of law, the
employee, in effect, never was discharged. 41 App. Div. 2d at 800, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 773.
50. 54 App. Div. 2d at 524, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 240.
51. See notes 152-70 infra and accompanying text.
52. For a graphic illustration of the various methods of benefit computation among
states, see [1967] lB UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 3001.
53. Id 11945.
54. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1327 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 451 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 597 (McKinney 1977).
55: See, eg., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1334 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 470 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 620 (McKinney 1977).
It is in the employer's interest to appeal an adverse determination because the em-
ployer's contribution to the state unemployment compensation fund is based both on the
total wages (as statutorily defined) paid and on the employer's "experience rating." The
experience rating "is based on the proposition that the cost of unemployment compensation
should be paid in such a way that those employers whose workers suffer the most involun-
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given to all interested parties of such an appeal, and the referee,
after giving the parties reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing,
may affirm, modify, or set aside the commissioner's determina-
tion. The statutes generally provide that the referee's determina-
tion is final unless appealed within a specified time.5 6
An additional appeal within the agency, however, is available
from the referee's determination. 7 This appeal is to a board
which may affirm, modify, or reverse the referee's determination
based on the record or new testimony from the parties.5 8 As with
the referee's determination, a determination of the appeals or re-
view board is final unless appealed. Appeal from a board deter-
mination is to a court of law,59 but the power of that court to
redetermine findings of fact varies among states. °
Other procedural safeguards which give the proceeding an ad-
judicatory character are the ability to be represented by counsel in
the hearing,61 the right to subpoena62 and depose63 witnesses, and
the adherence to formal evidentiary rules in the hearings. 64 The
existence of these adjudicatory characteristics indicates that the
proceedings should be given preclusive effect 65 unless the section
301 suit requires a redetermination of the issues adjudicated in the
unemployment compensation proceedings.
tary unemployment should pay at a higher rate than those employers whose workers suffer
little involuntary unemployment." [1967] IB UNEMPL. INS. REP. (CCH) 1120. The
greater the number of former employees eligible for benefits, the greater the amount that
the employer will have to pay into the unemployment fund. Thus, an employer has an
incentive tai appeal a determination that an employee is eligible for unemployment
benefits.
56. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1334 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 471 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 620-621 (McKinney 1977).
57. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1336 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 473 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 621 (McKinney 1977).
58. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 473 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 621 (McKinney 1977).
59. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 410 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 520 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 624 (McKinney 1977).
60. Cf. Cooperman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., 49 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6-7, 122
Cal. Rptr. 127, 131 (1975) ("[The appeals board] does not have constitutional authority to
make final determinations of fact"; therefore, de novo determination by court). Contra,
Robert S. Abbott Publishing Co. v. Annunzio, 414 IIl. 559, 112 N.E.2d 101 (1953) (no de
novo review; standard of review by court is manifestly against the weight of evidence).
61. See, e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW § 538 (McKinney 1977).
62. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 500 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981).
63. See, e.g., id § 503.
64. But see N.Y. LAB. LAW § 622 (McKinney 1977) (referee and appeals board not
bound by common law rules of evidence or formal rules of procedure).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(2), Comment c (Tent. Draft
No. 7, 1980).
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II. SECTION 301 OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT
Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)
provides that actions for damages arising out of a breach of the
collective bargaining agreement may be brought by or against a
labor union in any United States district court having jurisdiction
over the parties without regard to the citizenship of the parties or
the amount in controversy.66 This section was included in the
amendments to the National Labor Relations Act67 in 194768 to
promote "the mutual responsibility necessary to vitalize collec-
tive-bargaining agreements. ' 69 The legislative history behind this
section indicates an effort to remove the procedural barriers to su-
ing unions for breach of the collective bargaining agreement. 7
0
Because unions are unincorporated associations, diversity of citi-
zenship had to be satisfied for all union members to bring suit in
federal court, individual service was required on every member,
and each member was personally liable for a judgment against the
union. Section 301, by allowing unions to sue and be sued as enti-
ties, removed the citizenship barrier and eliminated the need for
personal service to each member. Section 301 also provided for
the satisfaction of any judgment against the union out of union
funds.7 '
A body of case law has developed around section 301, and, in
particular, cases have been brought to compel arbitration pursu-
ant to an arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment.72 In deciding these cases, the courts first had to determine
whether state or federal law applied. The Supreme Court, in Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 73 held that section 301 was
more than jurisdictional and "authorizes federal courts to fashion
66. LMRA § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
67. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
68. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136.
69. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Acr, 1947, at 423 (1948).
70. See, eg., S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 15-18 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947, at 421-24(1948); 93 CONG. REc. 5146 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Ball), reprinted in U NLRB, LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947, at 1497 (1948).
71. LMRA § 301(b), 29 U.S.C. § 185(b) (1976). For an analysis of the many changes
in the NLRA brought about by the Taft-Hartley Act, including § 301, see Cox, Some 4s-
pects of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (pts. 1-2), 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 274
(1948); Developments in the Law-The Taft-Harley Act, 64 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1951).
72. E.g., United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
73. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bar-
gaining agreements . . . ." In addition, the Court stated that
courts must fashion the federal law "from the policy of the na-
tional labor laws."75
Five years after Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court, in Local
174, International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Lucas lour Co. ,76
ruled that when a state court has jurisdiction in a matter which
would be covered by section 301, federal labor law, not state law,
applies.77 This holding was based on the importance of labor law,
which made the need for a single body of federal law "particularly
compelling. '" 7
8
Section 301 speaks of unions' ability to sue or be sued and
does not mention specifically the employee's right to sue for
breach of the agreement. The section, however, has been inter-
preted to allow suits by an individual employee. In Smith v. Eve-
ning News Association,7 the Supreme Court held not only that an
individual employee could bring suit to enforce the provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement,80 but also that jurisdiction
74. Id at 451.
75. Id at 456.
76. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
77. Id at 103.
78. Id at 104.
79. 371 U.S. 195 (1962). In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562
(1976), the Court noted that § 301 allows an employee to vindicate "uniquely personal"
rights such as "wages, hours, overtime pay, and wrongful discharge."
Although suits by individual employees are allowed under § 301, an employee is unable
to sue until all available administrative remedies have been exhausted. Republic Steel
Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). This inability to sue is particularly evident where
the collective bargaining agreement provides an exclusive grievance procedure for dispute
resolution. Reasoning that an employee cannot bring a suit for breach of contract when he
or she has broken the contract by not exhausting the contractually defined grievance proce-
dures, courts will not allow a § 301 suit by an employee who has not pursued the grievance
procedures. See, e.g., Hayes v. New England Millwork, 602 F.2d 15 (Ist Cir. 1979).
A discharged employee can defeat the employer's failure to exhaust administrative rem-
edies defense by proving "that the union as bargaining agent breached its duty of fair
representation in its handling of the employee's grievance," Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,
186 (1967), or by proving that the employer's conduct "amounts to a repudiation of [the]
contractual provisions." Id at 185. In addition, the employee may sue without exhausting
the grievance procedures if there are "circumstances which would make arbitration futile."
Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 875 (3d Cir. 1972).
Damages are measured by the wages lost because of the breach minus any unemploy-
ment compensation benefits received. Local 2195, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v.
International Paper Co., 488 F. Supp. 877 (D. Or. 1980). The employee also may be enti-
tled to attorneys fees and punitive damages if the employer's conduct manifests a gross
disregard for the employee's rights. Tedford v. Peabody Coal Co., 383 F. Supp. 787 (N.D.
Ala. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 533 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1976).
80. 371 U.S. at 200.
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under section 301 is not displaced by the jurisdiction of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (the Board) over breaches of collec-
tive bargaining agreements constittiting unfair labor practices.,"
In a suit by an employee against his or her employer for
breach of the collective bargaining agreement, the court should
interpret that agreement in a manner that best will promote the
national labor policy.82 A major tenet of that policy is that there
be a single body of labor law, developed by the Board.8 3 This
tenet is evidenced by the application of only federal law in section
301 suits8 4 and the Board's dominance in the administration of
that law. The Supreme Court, in holding that the Board's juris-
diction had preempted state action in labor law, stated:
[W]hen federal power constitutionally is exerted for the protec-
tion of public or private interests, or both, it becomes the
supreme law of the land and cannot be curtailed, circumvented
or extended by a state procedure merely because it will apply
some doctrine of private right. To the extent that the private
right may conflict with the public one, the former is
superseded.8 5
Just as private rights must yield to the public interest embod-
ied by the Board's national administration of the labor laws, so
too must private rights yield to the development of the national
labor law, as formed in section 301 actions.86 The most important
development of law regarding section 301 suits is the emergence of
the concept that a collective bargaining agreement is more than an
ordinary contract for the sale of goods. The seminal statement on
the collective bargaining agreement was made in United Steel-
81. "The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also vio-
lates a collective bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and
does not destroy the jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Id at 197.
82. In defining the national labor policy, a court may be aided by 29 U.S.C. § 151
(1976), the National Labor Relations Act's findings and declaration of policy section,
which states:
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representa-
tives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and condi-
tions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
83. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 242 (1959).
84. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
85. Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485, 500-01 (1953).
86. Since § 301 suits are to be decided in a manner which will promote a uniform
labor policy, the private rights adjudicated in a § 301 suit, if in conflict with the public
policy, must yield to the public policy.
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workers v. Warrior & GufNavigation Co. :8"
The collective bargaining agreement states the rights and
duties of the parties. It is more than a contract; it is a genera-
lized code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen
cannot wholly anticipate. . . .The collective agreement covers
the whole employment relationship. It calls into being a new
common law-the common law of a particular industry or of a
particular plant. 8
The agreement establishes the relationship between the parties
and forms the shop or industry's system of governance, just as a
statutory code would establish the relationship and system of gov-
ernance between the government and private parties. The Court
in Warrior noted that contractual gaps should be interpreted "by
reference to the practices of the particular industry and of the var-
ious shops covered by the agreement."8 9
In addition to focusing on the practices of the particular shops
or industry to interpret the collective bargaining agreement, courts
are guided by the rules of contract construction, 90 past practice
and custom,91 and arbitrators' interpretations of vague words and
phrases. 92 Each word, however, must be interpreted within the
individual agreement's context.
In sum, section 301 suits feature the application of federal
common law which reflects national labor policy and the interpre-
tation of the contract as a complex set of rules governing the rele-
vant shop or industry's entire operation. The interrelationship
among these features of section 301, the doctrine of res judicata,
and the principles of unemployment compensation will be the fo-
cus of this Note's next section.
III. THE INTERRELATIONSHIP-RES JUDICATA,
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, AND SECTION 301
The second Restatement of Judgments sections 131 and 134
provide a useful framework for relating the characteristics of un-
employment compensation schemes and section 301 suits to the
87. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
88. Id at 578-79.
89. Id at 580.
90. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers Lodge No. 1194 v. Gar-
wood Indus., Inc., 368 F. Supp. 357, 363 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
91. Local 2195, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v. International Paper Co., 488 F.
Supp. 877, 880 (D. Or. 1980).
92. Id (court relied on arbitration decisions to determine whether employer's failure
to follow progressive discipline procedures precluded discharge).
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policies which underlie the application of res judicata. The sec-
ond Restatement's position93 is that res judicata usually should
apply where the first tribunal was competent to render the judg-
ment-once a party has had a full opportunity to litigate an issue,
that party should be precluded from relitigating. It is only in unu-
sual circumstances that res judicata should not apply.94 The sec-
ond Restatement lists these circumstances as exceptions to the
general rules that administrative tribunal determinations are
treated like those of courts of law95 and state court determinations
should be accorded the same effect in federal court as they would
in the rendering state.96
There are three exceptions to the above stated rules which can
be used in determining what effect a state unemployment compen-
sation determination should have in a subsequent section 301 suit
in federal court. The first exception relates to the initial proceed-
ing's adjudicative nature. Thus, unemployment compensation
determinations should only be given preclusive effect if the pro-
ceedings before a board of appeals contain the essential elements
of adjudication.97 The second exception pertains to the expedi-
tious nature of the initial proceeding. If the initial proceeding is
intended to be especially expeditious, preclusive effect should not
be given to its determinations.98 The final exception focuses on
the scheme of remedies contemplated in the second proceeding to
determine whether this scheme warrants an independent determi-
nation of the second proceeding's issue. This factor should be
considered in both the administrative and the state/federal res
judicata contexts. 99 Each of these factors is treated separately
below.
93. See notes 11-16 & 20 supra and accompanying text.
94. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1, Comment g (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1977).
95. Id § 131 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
96. Id § 134.
97. Id § 131(2). For a discussion of this factor, see notes 152-70 infra and accompa-
nying text.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(4)(a) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
For a discussion of this factor, see notes 171-78 infra and accompanying text.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 131(4)(b), 134(3) (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980). For a discussion of this factor, see notes 179-88 infra and accompanying text. No
distinction is made in the discussion of this issue between the administrative res judicata
issue and the state/federal issue as the factor is the same for both. Section 134 speaks of
state "court" determinations, but according to § 131, administrative determinations are
given the same effect as court determinations. Section 134, therefore, should be interpreted
as giving state agency determinations the same effect in federal court that they would be
given in the rendering state.
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Before exploring the exceptions, however, it is important to ex-
amine the requirements of issue preclusion to determine whether
the general rules apply. The policies for and against the general
application of res judicata also will be examined to compare these
policies with those which apply specifically to administrative or
state/federal res judicata.
A. Res Judicata
The general rule of issue preclusion, as outlined in the second
Restatement of Judgments,"° can be divided into five require-
ments: (1) a final and valid judgment in the first action; (2) an
identity of issues between the two actions; (3) an identity of par-
ties in both actions; (4) actual litigation of the issue in the first
action; and (5) necessity of the issue to the first determination.101
These requirements and their applicability to unemployment
compensation are discussed individually below. A discussion of
the policies for and against the application of collateral estoppel
follows.
1. Finality and Vaiidiy of First Determination
A determination of just cause does not have preclusive effect
unless it is part of a valid and final judgment.l°2 A valid judgment
is one rendered by a court with jurisdiction over both the subject
matter and parties, after the parties have been given adequate no-
tice of the proceedings."0 3 In determining whether the unemploy-
ment compensation determination is such a judgment, the
tribunal in which preclusion is sought must determine whether
there was "a valid legislative delegation authoriz[ing] the agency
to consider matters raised in the earlier proceeding.' Since
state unemployment appeals boards are authorized to determine
eligibility for benefits, 05 and notice is given to all interested par-
100. See note 3 supra.
101. For an extensive analysis of the requirements of resjudicata, see Overseas Motors,
Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., 375 F. Supp. 499, 509-24 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aft'd, 519 F.2d 119
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
102. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
103. Id § 4 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
104. Note, supra note 6, at 73 (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S.
381, 403 (1940), in which the Supreme Court held that a Bituminous Coal Commission
opinion was res judicata after determining that the delegation of power to the commission
was valid).
105. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 401-411 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 470 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 620-621 (Mc-
Kinney 1977).
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ties of an appeal,"°6 judgments rendered by appeals boards are
valid judgments.
The element of finality does not require that the judgment be
immutable, only that it "make a currently effective disposition of
the issues raised."1 7 Traditionally, if a judgment has attained the
requisite finality necessary for appeal, then the judgment is said to
be final for issue preclusion purposes.10 8  The second Restate-
ment's position, however, is that an issue, as opposed to a claim,
need not be part of a technically final judgment to have preclusive
effect. Such a situation would occur, for example, in a split trial
where the issues of liability and damages were determined sepa-
rately. The second Restatement's position is that the determina-
tion on liability should have preclusive effect even though final
disposition does not occur until the damages are determined and a
final judgment is entered. The second Restatement would con-
sider whether the parties were heard fully, whether there was a
reasoned decision on the issue by the court, and whether the deci-
sion was appealable or appealed before giving preclusive effect to
an issue prior to final judgment. 0 9
In administrative law, however, the finality requirement is
troublesome because many statutory schemes allow agencies to re-
consider their determinations for a stated period of time after the
initial determinations. 011 For issue preclusion purposes, determi-
nations subject to reconsideration are not final until either the end
of the reconsideration period or the redetermination is precluded
by an appeal."' In determining a state unemployment compensa-
106. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
107. Overseas Motors, Inc. v. Import Motors Ltd., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 499, 517 (E.D.
Mich. 1974), a27'd, 519 F.2d 119 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
108. See, eg., RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment a (1942) (decision not
final if further action by the rendering court is required to determine the matter litigated).
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 41, Comment g (Tent. Draft No. 1,
1973). The Restatement's position is based partly on Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil
Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied sub nonm Dawson v. Lummus Co., 368
U.S. 986 (1962), which stated, "'[F]inality' in the context here relevant may mean little
more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees
no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again." Id at 89.
The Restatement's position on this issue was criticized during the discussion on the
tentative draft for not giving enough guidance to practitioners in deciding when a determi-
nation of an issue is final for issue preclusion purposes. 50 ALl PROCEEDINGS 273-78
(1973).
110. See, ag., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1332 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 453 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 597(3) (McKinney 1977). See
generally K. DAvis, supra note 6, § 18.09.
111. See Note, supra note 6, at 73-75.
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tion determination's finality, the court in which preclusion is
sought should examine the unemployment compensation statute.
Most statutes specify that a decision by a board of appeals or re-
view is final unless an appeal is taken. 1 2 This determination is
complicated by the holding of at least one state's courts that al-
though the statute makes the appeal board's determination final,
the board lacks constitutional authority to make final determina-
tions for the purposes of res judicata.1 3 Alternatively, a state un-
employment compensation determination in a state in which an
appeals board is constitutionally authorized to make a final deter-
mination would be final for issue preclusion purposes once it has
been finally determined, either through redetermination or
appeal.
2. Identity of Issues
Issue preclusion requires identity of issues in the two actions.
To satisfy this requirement, a court must analyze the scope of the
prior decision to determine which facts were found to be true.
The court then must compare those facts with the allegations in
the pleadings to determine if the same issues are raised in both
actions. 14 A relevant factor to consider in this determination is
whether the claims are based on different statutes. Some courts
refuse to give preclusive effect to a finding based on a statute dif-
ferent from the one applicable in the second proceeding, despite
the fact that the language in both statutes is similar or identical.' '
112. See, e.g., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 410 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
48, § 520 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 623 (McKinney 1977). See
notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
113. See note 165 infra and accompanying text.
114. Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Agency Findings in Federal Agency Proceed-
ings, 64 IowA L. REv. 339, 344 (1979). In determining the precise issues in the two actions,
courts may follow this definition of an issue: "An issue is a single, certain and material
point arising out of the allegations and contentions of the parties." Paine & Williams Co.
v. Baldwin Rubber Co., 113 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1940).
115. See, e.g., Garner v. Giarrusso, 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978) (state Civil Service
Commission finding not determinative on issue of racial discrimination in employee's dis-
charge in subsequent federal suit based on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Tipler v.
E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (NLRB determination not
binding in subsequent Title VII suit on issue of whether the employee had been discrimina-
torily discharged based on race); Lane v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 185 F.2d 819 (6th Cir.
1950) (National Railroad Adjustment Board finding not binding on Railroad Retirement
Board on issue of a person's status as an employee). But see, e.g., Safir v. Gibson, 432 F.2d
137 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970) (Federal Maritime Commission's determina-
tion that reduction of rates was unjustly discriminatory in an action based on the Shipping
Act of 1916 is preclusive in action based on the Merchant Marine Act).
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The issue sought to be precluded in the section 301 action is a
mixed question of law and fact-the decision is based both on a
finding of whether certain events occurred (a question of fact) and
whether those events constituted just cause for termination under
the state statute (a question of law). Thus, the decision asserted in
federal court is based, in part, on an interpretation of state law.
Before giving preclusive effect to a finding, the federal court
must decide whether the state interpretation of just cause for dis-
charge is identical to that which would be given under a collective
bargaining agreement. Since the unemployment compensation
determination is based on state law, whereas the federal court ac-
tion is based on an interpretation of a specific collective bargain-
ing agreement," 6 a forceful argument can be made that the issues
in the two actions are not identical, despite the identity of lan-
guage, because two different standards apply. If this argument is
accepted, the identity of issues requirement of res judicata would
not be met and issue preclusion could not be applied. If the argu-
ment is not accepted, then the issues would be deemed identical
and the requirement of issue identity would be satisfied. Because
the determination regarding identity of issues is based on the in-
terpretation of just cause for discharge given in the state unem-
ployment compensation proceeding, it is impossible to decide
whether this requirement is satisfied without knowing the state's
interpretation of misconduct.
3. Identity of Parties
In addition to requiring an identity of issues, issue preclusion
also requires that there be an identity of parties in the two actions.
Fundamental fairness dictates that only those who were parties to
a proceeding should be bound by its judgment." 7 The identity of
parties requirement has been deemed satisfied when there is
"identity of interest"" 8 between the parties in the two actions.
Identity of interests includes "situations in which the party in the
first proceeding had the same interest to protect ais the party
against whom preclusion is sought in the second proceeding."'"19
116. See notes 87-92 supra and accompanying text.
117. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122
P.2d 892, 894 (1942).
118. Note, supra note 114, at 343.
119. Id For cases involving judicial estoppel of nonparties who had an identity of
interests with former parties, see Cauefield v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 378 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.),
ajfg 247 F. Supp. 851 (E.D. La. 1965), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967); In re Air Crash
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The parties would be identical in a claim for unemployment
compensation and a suit for breach of a collective bargaining
agreement. The employee is involved actively in both proceed-
ings, first by claiming against the state for benefits and then by
suing the employer for breach of the collective bargaining agree-
ment. The employer also is involved in both proceedings, al-
though technically the employer is not a party to the initial
determination of benefits since the employee's claim is actually
against the state. The employer, however, does become a party to
the action once the initial determination is appealed by the em-
ployee or employer.' The employer has an interest in minimiz-
ing the number of his former employees entitled to benefits' 2 ' and
may be involved actively in the appeals procedure. The employer
also is a party in the section 301 suit; therefore, under such cir-
cumstances, both the employer and employee would be parties to
both actions.
Tied to the requirement of identity of parties or their privies is
the requirement of mutuality: a person attempting to bind an-
other to a determination must be bound by the determination. 2 2
The mutuality requirement has been relaxed by the courts to al-
low a nonparty to the initial action to assert the initial determina-
tion against a party to that action. The rationale for this
relaxation is that the party to the first action had a fair opportu-
nity to pursue the claim and should not be permitted to relitigate
the issue. 23 The relaxed requirement allows a nonparty to the
unemployment compensation proceeding to assert the proceed-
ing's determination against a party to that proceeding. This asser-
tion might occur, for example, if the employer assigned his or her
interest after the section 301 suit was filed. If the assignee was
substituted for the former employer in the subsequent section 301
suit, the assignee could assert the prior unemployment compensa-
tion determination against the employee, assuming the employee
Disaster near Dayton, Ohio, 350 F. Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'dsub nor. Humphreys
v. Tann, 487 F.2d 666 (6th Cir. 1973).
Identity of interests also causes those who are in privity with an actual party to be
bound by the judgment. "Privity exists if a nonparty has a sufficient interest in, participa-
tion in, or control of the prior litigation to make the determination in that litigation binding
on him." Note, supra note 6, at 80.
120. Telephone interview with Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, Board of Review
(Feb. 13, 1981).
121. See note 55 supra.
122. lB J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.441[3] (2d ed. 1948).
123. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979); Blonder-Tongue
Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 404 U.S. 313 (1971).
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had a fair opportunity to present his or her claim, even though the
assignee was not a party to that proceeding. Thus, even if the par-
ties were not identical, if the party against whom preclusion is
sought was a party to the initial proceeding, the initial determina-
tion could be asserted to bar relitigation on the issue.
4. Actual Litigation of Issue in First Proceeding
Issue preclusion operates only on those issues actually litigated
or raised and for which "each party has had an opportunity to
argue its position in some form."' 2 4 A leading commentator sug-
gests that default judgments, consent judgments, and judgments
upon stipulation should not be given preclusive effect.' 25 This po-
sition assumes that adversary litigation helps guarantee correct de-
terminations, and if a determination is made in a nonadversarial
proceeding, it should have no effect beyond that case.' 26
Another reason to deny preclusive effect to unlitigated issues is
to allow persons to determine whether to defend or prosecute vig-
orously every issue. By giving preclusive effect only to those is-
sues that a party has decided to litigate, the courts assure a person
that he or she will not be bound by determinations which were
believed unworthy of full litigation. 127
The requirement of actual litigation would deny preclusive ef-
fect to the determination of just cause in the unemployment com-
pensation proceeding if the reason for discharge were not a
contested issue. Preclusive effect also might be denied if the em-
124. Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus, 77 F.R.D. 448,453 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See South-
ern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
The Restatement takes the position that "[w]hen an issue is properly raised, by the
pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is determined, the issue is
actually litigated . . . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment d
(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
125. IB J. MooRE, supra note 122, 0.443[3]. Courts, however, disagree about the
validity of this premise. Compare Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'r & Mach., Inc.,
575 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978) (preclusive effect denied a consent judgment) with Martino v.
McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1979) (consent judgment given
preclusive effect).
The second Restatement authors note that the result of giving preclusive effect to unliti-
gated issues would be "to discourage compromise, to decrease the likelihood that the issues
in an action would be narrowed by stipulation, and thus to intensify litigation." RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENIS § 68, Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
126. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 122, 0.443[3].
127. Polasky's rationale for this requirement is "the recognition that a defendant may
for various reasons fail to raise a defense or to litigate an issue thoroughly where the
amount at stake does not seem to justify the expense and vexation of a maximum defense
effort." Polasky, supra note 125, at 226.
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ployer had not responded to notice of the employee's claim be-
cause of a belief that the amount at stake was not worth litigating.
In this situation, a default judgment would be entered in favor of
the employee, but the judgment would not be given preclusive ef-
fect. The federal court in which preclusion is sought would have
to determine which issues actually were contested between the
parties in the initial action and only could give preclusive effect to
the finding on just cause if indeed that were a contested issue.
5. Necessity of Issue to Initial Determination
Because issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of an issue a
party normally would have had the right to litigate, the rule re-
quires that issue to have been necessary to the rendition of the first
judgment. This requirement ensures that determinations of trivial
issues in the first proceeding do not preclude later determination
of a more important issue.' 28 Issues which are necessary to the
first decision should be distinguished from issues which are collat-
eral to and not necessary to support the decision; the latter type of
issues are not conclusive in subsequent actions. 29
Whether the determination of just cause for discharge is neces-
sary to the first action depends on the outcome of the first action.
If the appeals board determined that benefits should be awarded,
then necessarily the board would have had to have determined
that no just cause existed for the discharge in the form of em-
ployee misconduct, as employee misconduct would have disquali-
fied the employee from receiving benefits.
If, however, benefits were denied, further inquiry must be
made to determine whether that denial was based solely on em-
ployee misconduct. If denial were based on the determination of
more than one issue,' 30 then neither of the issues is deemed essen-
tial to the judgment, even though each issue standing separately
could have supported that judgment.' 3' When benefits are de-
128. See generally Evergreens v. Nunan, 141 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
720 (1944).
129. 1B J. MOORE, supra note 122, 0.443[5].
130. A denial also might be based on the employee's failure to qualify as an eligible
employee either because the employer was not a participating employer, the employee had
not been employed for the statutory period prior to discharge, or the employee had not
received previous wages equal to the statutorily required amount.
131. "If a judgment of a court of first instance is based on determinations of two issues,
either of which standing independently would be sufficient to support the result, the judg-
ment is not conclusive with respect to either issue standing alone." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment i (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
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nied, the court in which preclusion is sought must determine that
denial was based solely on the employee's misconduct for this
finding to have been necessary to the unemployment compensa-
tion determination.
B. Policy Considerations
The basic policy underlying res judicata's application is that
there be finality to litigation. 132 Within this concept of finality are
further considerations, three of which have been recognized as
"undergirding factors" by a leading commentator on collateral es-
toppel.1 33 These factors are:
(1) a desire to husband the time of the courts by preventing
relitigation of claims and issues which have been fully consid-
ered and settled, (2) a wish to save litigants from multiplicity of
litigation and harassment by dissatisfied suitors whose claims
have been once tried, and (3) a desire to maintain the prestige
of the courts by refusing to allow litigants to overturn by indi-
rection a decision which has been rendered. 134
These factors represent a condensation of rationales which
courts have given for the application of res judicata 1 35 Res judi-
cata also avoids imposing conflicting burdens on individuals. 136 If
collateral estoppel were not applied, courts could reach conflicting
results and parties might be unable to comply with both judg-
ments. Issue preclusion's application also encourages full litiga-
tion in the initial proceeding. 137 A party should not be able to
avoid litigating an issue in one tribunal with the hope that another
tribunal will render a more favorable result. Because determina-
tions are conclusive not only in the instant case, but also in future
cases, a party will litigate vigorously in the first and only pro-
ceeding.
132. See Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United
States, 168 U.S. 1, 49, 51 (1897); Painters Dist. Council No. 38 v. Edgewood Contracting
Co., 416 F.2d 1081, 1084 (5th Cir. 1969).
133. Vestal, supra note 6, at 858.
134. Id See also Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.L 29 (1964).
135. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979) ("Resjudicata thus encourages
reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other
disputes."); Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) ("[Issue preclusion] rests
upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establish-
ment of certainty in legal relations."); Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 49
(1897) ("[Res judicata's] enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order, for,
the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights.. . if...
conclusiveness did not attend the judgments of such tribunals... ).
136. See Martino v. McDonald's Sys., Inc., 598 F.2d 1079, 1084-85 (7th Cir. 1979).
137. Note, supra note 6, at 69.
1981]
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There are also policies which suggest that issue preclusion
should not always be applied. 38 The underlying policy to fully
litigate issues in the first controversy must be balanced against the
need to conserve judicial resources. If even the most insignificant
issues were litigated fully, trial time would increase dramatically.
The balance between full litigation of every issue and conserva-
tion of judicial resources is struck by granting preclusive effect
only to material and necessary issues of the first proceeding.1
39
Fairness to litigants is another reason why issue preclusion
should not always be applied. 14 0 If, for example, the party had no
way to foresee that the second action would be used adversely,
and the first action was for a small amount of money and/or had
fewer procedural safeguards, it would be unfair to bind the party
to that determination. 14  A party who does not think that an issue
warrants litigation, however, can avoid preclusive effect being
given its determination by stipulating the issue or entering a con-
sent judgment. 42
The strongest policy against giving preclusive effect to issue
determinations is that a court may contravene an overriding pub-
lic policy related to the second action. "43 In determining whether
there is an overriding public policy, the court in the second action
should look to the legislative intent behind the statute under
which the action is brought and the court decisions interpreting
that statute.44 An example of such an overriding policy might be
the need for a single body of law developed by one agency with
138. The first Restatement of Judgments, in its position on the applicability of collat-
eral estoppel to questions of law, stated that a determination is "not conclusive if injustice
would result." RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 70 (1942). The second Restatement enu-
merates specific circumstances under which issue preclusion should not be applied. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68.1 (TENT. DRAFT No. 4, 1977).
139. See notes 128-31 supra and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 330-31 (1979).
141. Id In Park/ane, the Court noted the unfairness that may result, but after review-
ing the facts, concluded that the party precluded could foresee subsequent litigation, had
every incentive to litigate the issue vigorously, and was afforded adequate procedural op-
portunities. Id at 332. The Court noted, by example, that lack of procedural opportunities
would occur if the defendant were forced to litigate in an inconvenient forum that pre-
cludes full-scale discovery or the calling of witnesses. Id at 331 n.15.
142. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
143. Tipler v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1971) (preclusion
not applied to NLRB determination in action for violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act because of the overriding policy encouraging private redress for employment
discrimination).
144. Cf. Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 472, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599 (1936) (public policy of a
state is the law of the state as defined by state statutes or the state's constitution).
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exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter in question.1 45 To
require the agency or court with exclusive jurisdiction to accept a
prior determination as conclusive robs the agency or court of the
opportunity to make independent judgments based on its expertise
and to effect the policy sought to be attained. 46
Another policy which might be contravened if all determina-
tions were given preclusive effect is that which encourages private
redress to enforce the law. In Garner v. Giarrusso, for example,147
the court affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff em-
ployee had been discriminated against in regard to transfer and
reevaluation. The district court's determination was made after a
complete hearing on all issues, despite the finding of a state civil
service commission that the employee had not been discharged
discriminatorily.148 The court noted that since "private litigants
play a vital role in vindicating 'the important congressional policy
against discriminatory employment practices,' "149 the "applica-
tion of res judicata [by the district court] would. . . have contra-
vened an important public policy favoring private litigation as a
means of eradicating employment discrimination.' ' 0 If a law re-
quires private initiative for its enforcement, a party may be de-
terred from bringing a claim to enforce that law if he or she is not
allowed to litigate all the relevant issues, but rather is bound, in-
stead, by a prior determination. In such situations, a court in
which preclusion is sought should deny issue preclusion to en-
courage actions brought to enforce the law.
The policies for and against issue preclusion's application fo-
cus on the need for finality of decisions and conservation of judi-
cial resources on the one hand and the requirement of fairness to a
litigant who may not have anticipated future consequences of a
determination and a desire to effectuate certain public policies on
the other hand. If policies for giving preclusive effect to a state
145. The NLRB is an example of an agency given exclusive jurisdiction over a specific
subject matter in order to enforce and promote uniformly the national labor policy. NLRA
§ 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1976).
146. See, ag., Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, 545 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1976), in which the
court found that the NLRB acted improperly by granting comity to a state labor board
certification of a union without its own investigation as to whether the union was an appro-
priate bargaining unit. The court noted that the NLRB cannot delegate its responsibility
for ensuring that this union is an appropriate bargaining unit "where Congress has sought
to create a national labor policy by vesting this discretion in a national board." Id at 360.
147. 571 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1978).
148. Id at 1341.
149. Id at 1337.
150. Id
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unemployment compensation determination outweigh the policies
against granting such preclusive effect, then issue preclusion
should be applied in a subsequent federal suit. If, however, poli-
cies favoring issue preclusion are outweighed by either the policies
against preclusion or the scheme of remedies in, or nature of, the
second action, 5 ' then collateral estoppel should not apply.
C. Exceptions to General Rules of Res Judicata
1. Adjudicatory Nature of State Unemployment Compensation
Proceedings
Section 131(2) of the second Restatement qualifies the general
rule that administrative determinations be given the same preclu-
sive effect as court determinations. The section notes that the
rules of res judicata apply "only insofar as the proceeding result-
ing in the determination entailed the essential elements of adjudi-
cation .. .""152 The second Restatement specifically enumerates
five factors essential to adjudication. The relationship of these
factors to state unemployment compensation proceedings must be
examined.
Section 13 l(2)(a) requires that adequate notice be given to the
parties who would be bound by the determination. Unemploy-
ment compensation laws provide for notice to the employer, both
when a claim is filed by a former employee153 and when an appeal
is taken by the employee.' 54 The acts also provide that interested
parties, both employees and employers, be given notice of all de-
terminations. 55  Thus, the notice requirement seems to be
satisfied.
Another essential element of adjudication, outlined in section
131(2)(b), is that the parties be given the opportunity to present
evidence and legal arguments in their favor and to rebut their op-
ponents' evidence and arguments. State unemployment statutes
require the review board to afford the parties "a reasonable op-
portunity for a fair hearing."' 56 This requirement is mandated by
the National Social Security Act, which conditions state participa-
tion in the national unemployment compensation plan on the
state's implementation of a plan affording the "opportunity for a
151. See notes 170-88 infra and accompanying text.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(2) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
153. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., CAL, UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1334 (West Supp. 1980).
156. See, e.g., id; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 471 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981).
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fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals
whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied."' 57
The Supreme Court interpreted the right to a fair hearing in an
administrative proceeding in Goldberg v. Kelly. 58 The Court held
that where a legal claim'59 was involved, a fair hearing included
the opportunity to confront any adverse witnesses and to present
argument and evidence orally. 60 Thus, through the "fair hear-
ing" requirement, state unemployment compensation schemes
seem to meet this second prerequisite of adjudication.
The third element of adjudicatory proceedings listed in the
second Restatement requires that issues of law and fact be decided
by applying established rules to specific transactions, specified
parties, or a particular status.' 6' This requirement implies that
there be a rule of law for deciding cases and uniform treatment of
similarly situated claimants. The unemployment compensation
statutes explicitly define covered parties and status for this pur-
pose.162 There is also a body of case law to aid in the develop-
ment of specified rules. In deciding a claim, an unemployment
compensation appeals board would apply the statutory language
to the given facts with the guidance of the appropriate case law.163
Hence, unemployment proceedings meet the third requirement of
adjudication.
Finality of the decision is the fourth essential element of adju-
dication. Although the unemployment compensation statutes pro-
vide that decisions by a review board are final unless appealed, 164
157. Social Security Act § 303(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(3) (1976).
158. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
159. A legal claim is one in which the claimant is entitled by right to the government
benefit upon a "showing of the existence of conditions specified by law." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131, Comment b (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980). A claim for unem-
ployment compensation benefits is a legal claim because the state must award benefits upon
a showing by the claimant that the statutory requirements are met.
160. 397 U.S. at 267-68. Although Goldberg specifically did not apply to unemploy-
ment compensation, one federal court held that a claimant is entitled to Goldberg proce-
dures before unemployment compensation benefits could be terminated. Wheeler v. State,
335 F. Supp. 856 (D. Vt. 1971).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(2)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
162. See, ag., CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 1252-1266 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN.
STAT.-ch-48,-§ 349 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980-1981); N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 51-1-512 (McKin-
ney 1977).
163. The appeals board could use the case law developed by courts reviewing appeals
board decisions to define a covered employee and conduct which constitutes just cause for
dismissal. Additionally, appeals board decisions themselves may become precedents for
future board action. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 409 (West Supp. 1980).
164. See notes 56-59 supra and accompanying text.
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at least one state's courts have concluded that the unemployment
appeals board does not have the constitutional power to make
final determinations for the purposes of res judicata ' 65 This view
is not the majority perspective, as most states consider unemploy-
ment compensation determinations final, even for res judicata
purposes. 166 Furthermore, the state interpretation of finality must
control, as state determinations are to be given the same weight in
federal court as they would be given in state court. 6 7 In states
other than those which apply the minority position, the finality
requirement of adjudication is met once the proceedings reach the
point specified in the controlling legislation.
The final factor includes other procedural elements which may
be necessary to constitute a conclusive determination of the matter
in question, such as the right to judicial review or compulsory pro-
cess. These other elements should be determined in light of "the
magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the urgency
with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity...
to obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions."' 168  Other
procedural opportunities afforded unemployment compensation
claimants are the right to be represented by counsel, to subpoena
and depose witnesses, 169 and to judicial review.170 These addi-
tional factors add to the procedural safeguards afforded in un-
employment compensation proceedings and, coupled with the
statutory requirement of a fair hearing, ensure that there will be a
conclusive determination of the matters in question.
165. Pratt v. Local 683, Film Technicians of the Motion Picture & Television Indus.,
260 Cal. App. 2d 545, 67 Cal. Rptr. 483 (1968). The court based its constitutional argument
on the fact that "contract rights are placed by the constitution under the protection of the
courts, where alone the questions of law and fact upon which they depend can be finally
decided." Id at 563, 67 Cal. Rptr. at 494. Since a contract right was at stake in the action
in which preclusion was sought, the court thought that only a court, and not an administra-
tive agency, could make a determination on the contract claim. The court did acknowledge
that an unemployment compensation determination has res judicata effect in a subsequent
action between the same parties before the same agency, but thought that an unemploy-
ment agency determination should have no resjudicata effect in a subsequent court action.
166. See, e.g., Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer (Northamerican), Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 885, 325
N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) requires that state court determinations have the same
effect in every court in the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the
rendering states. To determine the weight to be given a state determination, therefore, that
state's law on the weight the determination should be given prevails.
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(2)(e) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
Comment c to this section enumerates elements of adjudicatory procedure.
169. See notes 61-63 supra and accompanying text.
170. See note 59 supra and accompanying text.
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The application of the above factors to unemployment com-
pensation proceedings demonstrates that the proceedings are in-
deed adjudicative and should be a6corded preclusive effect unless
other policies require a redetermination of the issue.
2. Expeditious Nature of Unemployment Compensation
Proceedings
Section 131(4)(a) states that an administrative determination
should not be given preclusive effect if that "would be incompati-
ble with a legislative policy that: [t]he determinations of the tribu-
nal adjudicating the issue be specially expeditious."'' Thus, if
there is a policy that an administrative proceeding be expeditious,
its determination should be denied preclusive effect so that parties
do not vigorously "dispute the administrative proceeding in antic-
ipation of its effect in another proceeding."172
The court, in Lewis v. IBM Corp. ,'7' applied this policy to
deny preclusive effect to an unemployment compensation deter-
uination. In Lewis, plaintiff was denied unemployment compen-
sation because he voluntarily quit his employment. Subsequently,
plaintiff brought suit for breach of his employment contract. The
defendant employer moved for summary judgment, asserting that
the unemployment compensation determination that Lewis volun-
tarily left work was binding in this action, and thus, Lewis had
breached the contract. The court denied defendant's motion on
the grounds that unfairness would result, noting disparity between
the amounts in question in the two actions,174 plaintiffs lack of
representation by counsel in the first proceeding, and his failure to
appeal the decision fully.' 75 More importantly, the court noted
that the state unemployment compensation board had submitted
an amicus brief arguing that to allow preclusive effect would harm
the unemployment compensation system. 76 The brief indicated
that if the unemployment compensation determinations would
have binding effect on the parties in subsequent litigation, an in-
creased number of persons would rely on counsel to represent
them and thus increase the length and complexity of hearings.
The amicus brief also noted that the present unemployment com-
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(4)(a) (rent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
172. Id, Comment h.
173. 393 F. Supp. 305 (D. Or. 1974).
174. Id at 308.
175. Id at 308-09.
176. Id at 309.
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pensation system could not absorb the extra time that this judicial
procedure would require. 1
77
The Lewis rationale applies to all unemployment compensa-
tion determinations. Preclusive effect would promote litigation
and appeals of all issues because of fear that adverse determina-
tions would cause great future harm. This excess litigation would
increase the determinations' time, complexity, and expense-an
unfavorable result, especially for the unemployed person in
dire need of the unemployment benefits and unable to afford
counsel. 178
Lewis, therefore, illustrates the principle outlined in the second
Restatement and is an adequate reason for a court in a section 301
suit to deny preclusive effect to state unemployment compensation
determinations.
3. Federal Scheme of Remedies
The third exception to the general rule that res judicata should
apply to state administrative determinations in a subsequent fed-
eral action highlights the second action. If the second action's re-
medial scheme contemplates a separate determination by that
tribunal, then the initial determination is not binding. 179 As ap-
plied to the present issue, this exception focuses on a section 301
suit, whereas the previous two exceptions focused on the unem-
ployment compensation schemes.
In a section 301 suit in which the employee claims that the
employer breached the collective bargaining agreement by dis-
charging the employee without just cause, the issue is whether the
employer's conduct violated the applicable collective bargaining
agreement. The court's function is to interpret this agreement in
light of the national labor policy. The court must determine
whether accepting the state finding of just cause as preclusive
177. Id But cf. Walsh v. Pluess-Staufer (Northamerican), Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 885, 325
N.Y.S.2d 19 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (preclusive effect given to unemployment compensation deter-
uination in breach of employment agreement suit). The court did not discuss the effect the
decision would have on future unemployment proceedings.
178. Giving preclusive effect to state unemployment compensation determinations may
give an unfair advantage to the party better able to afford appeals, presumably the em-
ployer. The party with fewer financial resources may be bound by a determination which
he or she could not afford to overturn on appeal, whereas the party who can afford to
appeal may receive a favorable decision on appeal and then later assert this decision as
preclusive.
179. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 131(4)(b), 134(3) (Tent. Draft No. 7,
1980).
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would further the federal labor policy-a policy which promotes
peaceful coexistence between workers and employers. 180
Protection of collective bargaining agreements' integrity is an
element of federal labor policy,'81 and any rule which would deter
employees from bringing suits to vindicate a breach of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement should be avoided. If a state unem-
ployment determination adverse to the employee were binding in
a section 301 suit, the employee would lack incentive to bring an
action to redress the wrongs to himself and the agreement's integ-
rity. An employer could discharge an employee for actions which
would constitute misconduct under the state unemployment stat-
ute but would not constitute just cause under the collective bar-
gaining agreement. 8 2  Thus, an employer could violate the
agreement and escape liability for damages to the injured em-
ployee. To encourage private parties to redress breaches of the
collective bargaining agreement, the court should allow parties the
benefit of a redetermination based exclusively on the agreement.
This conclusion also holds in cases where the unemployment
compensation determination favors the employee. The employee
still could bring an action against the former employer to recover
the difference between lost wages and any unemployment com-
pensation benefits received. If the state determination were given
preclusive effect in this situation, the employee could be granted
summary judgment on liability and the court then would have
only to determine damages. Although this result would aid the
employee in presenting a claim, it would be an unfavorable result
because, once again, the state standard for just cause may be dif-
ferent from the standard in the collective bargaining agreement.
The employee's behavior in this situation may not constitute suffi-
cient misconduct to disqualify him or her for unemployment ben-
efits but may be sufficient conduct under the collective bargaining
agreement to warrant termination. 8 3 The employer, therefore,
180. Cf. NLRB v. Prettyman, 117 F.2d 786, 792 (6th Cir. 1941) ("The purpose of the
National Labor Relations Act is to promote peaceful settlement of disputes between em-
ployers and employees by providing legal remedies for the invasion of employees' rights of
self organization and collective bargaining. .. ").
181. Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1972).
182. See, ag., Local 2195, Lumber & Sawmill Workers Union v. International Paper
Co., 488 F. Supp. 877, 880 (D. Or. 1980), in which the court held that the employer's failure
to follow the progressive discipline procedures required by the contract in terminating an
employee made that employee's discharge without cause, as applied to that contract.
183. E.g., when an employee breaks an employer work rule which, under the collective
bargaining agreement, would be just cause for termination, but which does not evince such
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would not have breached the agreement by discharging the em-
ployee, and the state determination that there was no just cause
for the employee's discharge should have no preclusive effect.
The policy that there be one uniform, national labor law re-
quires that the court make a separate determination from and re-
fuse to give preclusive effect to the state determination. Disparate
results could accrue if separate states had different interpretations
of just cause for discharge under their own unemployment com-
pensation statutes. 18 4 If the state interpretations were preclusive,
then arguably the same agreement, if applicable to employees in
more than one state,185 could be subject to different interpreta-
tions. Employee conduct would be just cause for discharge in one
instance, but the same conduct would not be just cause in another
instance. Such a result would not comport with the notion that a
collective bargaining agreement should be interpreted as a body
of regulations governing the conduct of all covered parties which
can effectuate a uniform labor policy.
The nature of collective bargaining agreements requires that a
court should not accept a state administrative determination as
binding, but should redetermine whether there was just cause for
the discharge. Collective bargaining agreements establish a sys-
tem of regulations governing the behavior of the affected par-
ties.'86 In determining whether a party's conduct violates this
system of regulations, the court must principally examine the reg-
ulations. In interpreting these regulations, the court also can ex-
amine the parties' previous conduct both in relation to these
regulations and the national labor policy. A state determination
that one of the parties violated a state norm of conduct, however,
should not be determinative that a violation of the regulations
outlined in the collective bargaining agreement also has occurred.
The state determination of just cause for purposes of its unem-
ployment compensation law, therefore, should not be binding on a
a disregard for the employer's interest as to be misconduct, as defined by state unemploy-
ment compensation laws.
184. Although all states generally apply the same standard to determine just cause for
discharge, see note 46 supra and accompanying text, the application of this standard to
different facts varies.
185. See [1978] 1 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: NEGOTIATIONS AND CoNTRACTs (BNA)
22:1-:50 (Ohio Bell Telephone Co. and Communication Workers union nation-wide con-
tract); id 26:1-:23 (Atlantic Richfield Co. and ARCO Pipe Line Co. and Oil, Chemical and
Atomic Workers union contract covering several states) for examples of collective bargain-
ing agreements covering employees in more than one state.
186. See notes 87-89 supra and accompanying text.
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federal court in determining whether the employer has breached a
provision of an agreement entered into between that employer
and the employee's representative union.
The determination of whether the conduct violates the collec-
tive bargaining agreement must be made in furtherance of the na-
tional labor policy. Since the Board is the primary body entrusted
with the formulation of the national labor policy, its conduct in an
analogous situation may be illustrative to a court in a breach of
contract suit. In proceedings before the Board for unfair labor
practices, both employees and employers have argued that state
unemployment compensation determinations of just cause should
preclude relitigation of whether the employer committed an unfair
labor practice in discriminatorily discharging an employee. The
Board, however, has rejected this argument repeatedly, preferring
to determine the just cause issue itself.1 7 Like the Board, a fed-
eral court in a section 301 suit is deciding issues in a manner to
promote a uniform labor policy and therefore should reject state
determinations as preclusive.
Despite the strong policies for applying res judicata, 88 partic-
ularly in federal court where a backlog of cases exists, and the
adjudicatory nature of state unemployment compensation deter-
minations,18 9 the decisions regarding the existence of just cause
for discharge should not be given preclusive effect. To give these
proceedings such an effect would hinder the unemployment com-
pensation process, as persons would litigate each issue vigorously
to guard against potential adverse effects.190 This litigation would
cause delays and expenses in a process which should be inexpen-
sive and speedy. Additionally, the section 301 suit and its under-
lying national labor law policy require that the court be free to
make determinations based on the individual agreement, rather
than on state unemployment law.' 9'
IV. CONCLUSION
The party asserting preclusion should have the burden of
proving the existence of the requirements of issue preclusion.
Once proven, the burden of production should shift to the party
187. See, eg., Western Meat Packers, Inc., 368 F.2d 65 (10th Cir. 1966); Cadillac
Marine & Boat Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 107 (1956); Horn Mfg. Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1177 (1949).
188. See notes 132-35 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 152-70 supra and accompanying text.
190. See notes 171-78 supra and accompanying text.
191. See notes 179-88 supra and accompanying text.
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opposing preclusion who must show either that allowing preclu-
sion will adversely affect the state agency's ability to make deter-
minations in an expeditious manner or that the nature of the
second action requires the federal court to determine the issue
anew. Unless the opponent of preclusion can meet this burden,
issue preclusion should apply.
The issue sought to be precluded must be examined carefully
to determine whether giving preclusive effect will have an adverse
impact on the first or second action's legislative scheme. When
the determination sought to be precluded is a factual one, it may
be proper to give preclusive effect to that determination. 92 If, for
example, a state unemployment compensation appeals board
made a factual finding that the employee was absent from work
twenty days without excuse, this factual finding should be given
preclusive effect in the federal court, as this determination of fact
does not depend on the interpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement. It is only when the determination asserted as preclu-
sive applies the facts to state law-for example, when the twenty
days of unexcused absences are interpreted as work-related mis-
conduct and therefore disqualifying conduct--that the court in the
federal action should inquire whether this application of state law
will conflict with the policies sought to be achieved in the second
action. Thus, the state unemployment compensation determina-
tion regarding just cause for discharge is a determination which
should be scrutinized because it is based on state unemployment
law as applied to certain historical facts. Since the policies against
giving preclusive effect to such a determination outweigh those
supporting preclusion, the court, in a section 301 suit, should not
be bound by the state determination, but should be free to redeter-
mine the just cause issue based on national labor law principles.
KATHY PITTAK LAZAR
192. Professor Vestal states with regard to administrative agency determinations: "If
the decision is a factual matter and if it has been rendered by an agency with fact-finding
procedures which approximate those of a court, then preclusion should obtain." Vestal,
supra note 6, at 874.
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